

A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Allan Carlson, the Howard Center, Rockford, IL

TWO FACTORS SHAPED THE ATTITUDES toward the family to be found in the early years of the United Nations. To begin with, the horrors created by the Nazi occupation of Europe—the death camps, the eugenics campaigns, the experimentation on human subjects—were vivid images in the minds of those who gathered in San Francisco in 1945 to inaugurate the new organization. It became important both to restore respect for the human person and to rescue the family as an ideal from the race-motivated distortions of Adolf Hitler.

Second, four rival world views emerged out of the rubble of World War II, seeking to shape the post-war environment. Dominant at the political and military level was the rivalry between the communism found in the Soviet Union and the liberal democracy of the Americans: the period from 1945 to 1990 is commonly seen through the lens of the resulting Cold War. At the social policy, and specifically at the family policy, level, a different competition of worldviews ensued, between Christian Democracy and Social Democracy.

The “Christian Democratic” Episode

Let us consider these latter two rivals. The Christian Democracy movement which took form in Europe in the mid-1940s claimed to be something altogether new. The Christian political movements in Europe of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had shown suspicion of modernity, distrust of democracy, opposition to individualism, and rejection of the legacy of the French Revolution.

Yet by the 1930s, something fresh and creative was emerging among Christian thinkers, with particular clarity in France. The key figure was Emmanuel Mounier. Writing in the Catholic idea-journal *Espirit*, Mounier worked out a Christianized version of individualism, called “personalism.” This idea system saw every human person as unique, a free agent with inherent moral qualities, and with rights rooted in a natural law. This vision placed strong emphasis on the importance of developing all dimensions of the human personality, “social as well as individual and spiritual as well as material.” Mounier emphasized that the full flowering of the individual would come only through social structures such as family, local community, and labor union. He called for creation of a revolutionary Christian party, one hard, one worthy of Christ, and one radical in its social-economic vision.¹

In 1943, a young Catholic philosophy student and disciple of Mounier, Gilbert Dru, drew up a manifesto for postwar Christian democratic work. He emphasized the revolutionary quality of true Christian action: the whole person must

become engaged, not just as a cog in a party machine, but as a militant working to build a new France on radical Christian principles. A year later, Dru paid for this manifesto with his life, being shot by the German gestapo in Lyons.²

The further elaboration of Christian democratic doctrine came primarily from two journalist-philosophers, Etienne Gilson and Etienne Borne, both writing for the journal, *Aube*. They rejected the atomistic individualism of the nineteenth century bourgeoisie which, they said, had exhibited a narrow, self-centered outlook and had shown “an indifference toward basic institutions such as the family.” These writers also scorned the socialists and communists for their materialism and hostility toward revealed religion. Indeed, bourgeois liberalism and communism could be seen as “two facets of a single error.” The task now facing western civilization was to reconcile true respect for the person and the reality of industrial society with Christian teaching; to find a middle way between bourgeois liberalism and collectivism.³

A second plank in the Christian democratic platform was that while the movement and party would be openly Christian, it would be neither clerical nor strictly Catholic. Following the anti-religious darkness of the Nazi conquest of Europe, this movement would instead seek to unite Catholic and Protestant believers and sympathetic others—Jews and agnostics—in a defense of Christendom as a civilization with religiously infused values.⁴

Christian Democracy also sought to deliver both freedom and justice, goals to be pursued with equal vigor. As Etienne Borne explained in his book, *Cet Inconnu*:

Freedom without justice is artificial, deceptive and hypocritical; it can be used to justify the mechanism of the free market and the servitude of the proletariat; such freedom is, in fact, the antithesis of freedom. Likewise, justice without freedom leads to tyranny and to the totalitarianism of Soviet communism or Fascist corporatism.⁵

To accomplish these tasks—to reconcile individualism with community and to deliver both justice and liberty—the Christian democrats gave priority to the defense of what they called natural social structures. These included neighborhoods, towns, labor unions, and churches, but the one given most attention was the family. Etienne Gilson, in his 1948 book *Notre Democratie*, neatly summarized the point:

From his birth to his death, each man is involved in a multiplicity of natural social structures outside of which he could neither live nor achieve his full development. . . . Each of

these groups possesses a specific organic unity; first of all, there is the family, the child's natural place of growth.⁶

These institutions were intrinsic or innate, meaning that they would always reappear out of the very instincts and nature of man. They also pre-existed the state; that is, the law did not create families and towns; it "found them." The great disorders of the early twentieth century could be explained, in part, by the weakening of the family, as an industrialism backed by materialistic philosophers stripped away family function after function. Policy should now seek to return functions to the family.⁷ But this would not mean a return to the patriarchal, paternalistic family system of old Europe. The father-dominated family could not be reconciled with personalism. Christian democrats held that women should know and enjoy equal civil, legal, economic, and political rights. At the same time, restoration of the family did mean that control of education should be returned to parents; that motherhood should enjoy special protection by the state; and that heads-of-households should receive a family wage, so that mothers might be empowered to remain home with their children.⁸

Unlike earlier Christian political movements, the postwar Christian democrats enthusiastically embraced political democracy as the superior venue for the full development of the free human personality. Indeed, they held that democracy itself derives from Christian principles, such as the equality of all believers. They even urged expansion of the democratic principle. As Gilson argued, "History has proven that political democracy is to a great extent based on fiction if it is not accompanied by a truly economic and social democracy." The movement stressed that economic life should be subordinate to spiritual life and the existence of families. This made Christian democrats the friend of widely distributed small property and an advocate for peasant or family farms. They favored strong state controls over large, impersonal corporations and the "humanization" of workplaces through measures such as the family wage.⁹

Undergirding the Christian democratic worldview was a new interpretation of history. Where the Christian churches had commonly been hostile to the French Revolution of 1789, and its program of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity," the new movement aimed at embracing the revolution and these words, albeit with a twist. As another leader of the young French movement, Maurice Schumann, put it, Christian Democracy "is the continuation of an effort, which dates from 1789, not only to reconcile the revolutionary tradition and Christian thought with each other, but to foster them reciprocally."¹⁰

This connection to the Revolution of 1789 also made human rights a central Christian democratic concern, but again with a special twist. Where secular views of the French experience relied on a naturalistic or evolutionary under-

standings of rights, the new movement emphasized the rooting of human rights in the creation itself, in the Natural Law. Such rights were "inviolable" and "innate" because their fountainhead was God Himself.¹¹ Bearing a healthy suspicion of the state, Christian democrats embraced human rights in order to protect "the natural rights of each individual" and of "natural social groups" from the overweening power of government. Also advancing social and economic democracy, the movement held to a positive view of social rights as necessary to the security and dignity of humanity.

Christian Democracy in the Early UN

The Christian democrats of Europe would carry these novel, exciting, even revolutionary ideas into the early assemblies of the new United Nations, with important results. In France, Christian Democracy took political form as the *Mouvement Republicain Populaire*, or *MRP*, which became part of the French governing coalition in 1946. Strong Christian Democratic parties also formed in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany.

This worldview had especial influence in the Economic and Social Council, or ECOSOC, which oversaw all UN work on issues of social policy and human rights, including the Commission on Human Rights, established in 1946. Named to head the Department of Social Affairs was Professor Henri Laugier of France, a figure sympathetic to the Christian democratic cause. More important, though, was Charles Habib Malik of Lebanon, who became president of ECOSOC in the critical year, 1948, and who actively served on the Commission on Human Rights.

Malik was an Arab Christian with a French education and a philosopher wholly in tune with the new Christian democratic currents. A rich Christian imagery ran through his speeches and writings, above all in his view that "there is a direct relationship between peacemaking and having the right relationship to God—the ground of being and existence." Echoing the words of the French Christian Democratic martyr Gilbert Dru, Malik called for a fundamental Western revolution, with "The Living God" at its core.

Another central player was Rene Cassin, a lawyer skilled in international law, also from France. As a staff member of the Commission on Human Rights, Cassin took the lead role in producing successive drafts of the Universal Declaration. While himself Jewish, Cassin was sympathetic to the French *MRP* and to the goals of Christian Democracy. In his own speeches and essays, he emphasized the derivation of the human rights idea from holy Scripture. The Jews, inspired by their idea of "one God, father of all men," held "rather early a vivid repugnance to serfdom." Jesus and Paul taught that "there is no more distinction between Jew and Gentile, between free men and slaves. All form one large family, one human family."¹² Cassin emphasized that the eighteenth century human rights declarations (such as the French

Declaration of the Rights of Man) had overly exalted individualism, which had opened the way to abuses of liberty. Drawing from Christian Democratic doctrine, Cassin argued that the rights and liberties of individuals must be understood “as embedded within social groups and bonds,” such as “family, household, vocation, city, and nation.”¹³

France was one of the eight nations assigned to the Commission on Human Rights; its delegation served on the drafting committee for the Universal Declaration, and included several Christian democrats, as did the delegations from Chile and Belgium. Meanwhile, the MRP leader Robert Schuman, as French Foreign Minister, insured a strong Christian democratic influence on the process from the domain of the Security Council.

Approved by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was, in one historian’s judgment, “largely identical” to the value system of Christian Democracy.¹⁴ Specifically, we find in Article 16c the affirmation of natural social institutions: “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.” The word, “natural,” comes straight out of the Christian Democratic worldview. Even the use of the word “society” here as distinct from and prior to the state is a Christian democratic marker.

In Article 25, one finds support for family social rights, with particular emphasis on a family wage:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

The Universal Declaration affirms the priority and autonomy of the family, as in Article 26(3): “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.” The very structure of the declaration embodies the unique Christian Democratic understanding of human rights. Articles 1–21 protect the political rights of persons against the ambitions of the state; in this, the document resembles the Bill of Rights found in the U.S. Constitution. Meanwhile, Articles 22–27 protect the “social and economic rights” of persons, precisely as Gilbert Dru or Etienne Gilson would have insisted.

Even the term, “equality,” subject before and later to so much mischief, finds rich meaning in the Universal Declaration through personalist conceptions of “the right to life” (Article 3), “the dignity and worth of the human person” (Preamble), and innate human nature (Article 1):

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Indeed, the only Christian Democratic theme lacking is an open affirmation of the Deity of Creation. Several members of the drafting committee, led by Charles Malik, sought inclusion of this idea. But in the end, they agreed to more universal language that implied, rather than named, God.¹⁵

In sum, the Christian Democratic worldview dominated discussion of social policy and human rights policy during the founding years of the United Nations, 1946–1948, and it remained an intellectual force there for at least another decade. While emergence of the Cold War put the brake for a time on further development of human rights documents, the promised international covenants on economic, social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights, finally issued in 1966, still affirmed that “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, and is entitled to protection by society and the state.”¹⁶

The Democratic Socialist Triumph

Yet by this time, a rival worldview was gaining ascendance within the United Nations structure: namely, Democratic Socialism. This idea system first took root at the UN through Scandinavian dominance of the Secretariat between 1946 and 1962, in the persons of Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld.

Norwegian Trygve Lie was the original secretary general of the new organization, serving from 1946 to 1953. From recently released documents, we now know that he was the first choice of the Soviet Union to assume this post, and that his name first surfaced on a candidate’s list through Alger Hiss, a U.S. State Department official later revealed as a Soviet agent. Despite some evidence to the contrary, Lie himself was probably never a true member of the Communist party. But he did have an early flirtation with Bolshevism, and in 1921 journeyed to Moscow, where he met with Lenin. Lie retained a strong sympathy for the Soviet experiment in Russia, and the Communists saw him as a pliable tool for their UN ambitions.

Lie was a leader of the Norwegian Labor party, a Social Democrat considered to be on the “hard left.” Active in shaping Norway’s domestic policy during the 1930s, he had gained a reputation as a fervent social engineer.¹⁷

Compromised by the politics of the Korean War, Lie resigned in early 1953. Replacing him was the Swedish civil servant, Dag Hammarskjöld. It is important to distinguish the myth of Hammarskjöld, still strong at the UN, from the man. He was, as one biographer puts it, a person of “rare sensibility and catholic interests.” A modern mystic, his Christianity was real and intense, albeit personal: not denominational, but one man’s daily dialogue with God. Born to an old noble Swedish family, with a tradition of service to king and state, Hammarskjöld never joined a political party. Yet in every way but officially, he was a Social Democrat. In the early 1930s, he acknowledged his conversion to “left socialist

intellectuality." He gained his PhD in economics at the University of Stockholm, and joined Gunnar Myrdal (his dissertation disputant) and Knut Wicksell (his mentor, and Minister of Finance in the Social Democratic government) in transforming Sweden into a socialist welfare state.

Hammarskjöld enjoyed the comradery of working with others over long spells to solve policy problems, and he expressed disappointment whenever a newly married colleague no longer put in the evening hours that he did. Hammarskjöld himself never married, and some of his contemporaries—including his predecessor Trygve Lie—whispered that he was a closeted homosexual. But this does not appear to be true. His biographers agree that sex played little, if any, part in his life. Rather, he was "almost asexual," a "born bachelor," "a determined loner." Relative to family issues, this meant that Hammarskjöld had little personal knowledge of the reality of marriage and child rearing, and was quite willing to leave such matters to his chosen "experts."¹⁸

Under the influence of Lie and Hammarskjöld, Democratic Socialism grew as an idea force within the secretariat. Scandinavians disproportionately peopled its offices, and adherence to the leaders' worldview became valuable to advancement.

Among those named to a key post was Alva Myrdal. Secretary General Lie knew of her work in the 1930s on the "population crisis." With husband Gunnar Myrdal, she had crafted a Social Democratic response to the sharp decline in Scandinavian birth rates. In essence, the Myrdals had argued that the only way to raise fertility to a replacement level was by socializing the costs and burdens of childrearing. Their theories, embodied in the 1934 book, *Kris i befolkningsfrÅgan*, gave an ideological justification for constructing the modern welfare state. Published in Norwegian translation in 1935, this volume and subsequent debate stimulated the creation of the Norwegian Commission on Population, and a series of Labor Party proposals to implement "the Myrdal line."¹⁹

Alva Myrdal drew Lie's attention again in 1948, through a speech at the UN offices in Geneva on "The Surplus Energy of Married Women." With her own new-model-marriage to Gunnar then in trouble,²⁰ Alva Myrdal argued that child rearing and housewifery were no longer enough to keep a modern woman content. They needed to move into the world of outside work.

In mid-December, 1948, Lie named Alva Myrdal as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for the UN's Social Commission. As such, she became the highest ranking woman at the UN: "third person from the top," as she would say. Her responsibilities were to manage UN work on women's issues, population, welfare, and human rights. Alva Myrdal saw this as the perfect opportunity to turn the UN Secretariat into a vehicle for the spread of her version of Social Democratic feminism. On 14 December 1948—ironically, the very same week that the UN General Assembly

approved the family affirming Universal Declaration—Alva Myrdal wrote to her friend, Disa Västberg:

It is for me a great pleasure to think that Social Democratic women—not only in Sweden, even if we most directly—now gain an unhindered opportunity to speak to and gain influence over the UN Secretariat. . . . [W]hat this women's group supports and wants is of such central importance to shaping the modern welfare state, that a key post in the UN's Social Department will allow this group the best chance to alter human society in line with its views.²¹

What were those Social Democratic feminist views? As articulated by Myrdal in the 1930s and 1940s, they are as follows: first, there are no moral absolutes. Morals, including traditional Christian morals, are merely the product of historical evolution and institutional change. If large numbers of persons no longer behaved in accord with so-called "moral standards," then those standards—rather than the people—needed to be changed. Second, the existing, so-called traditional family inherited from the nineteenth century "is almost . . . pathological," "rootless," "isolated," and doomed. It should be replaced by a new family model, where women stood beside men "as comrades" in outside labor; where children became a social—meaning governmental—responsibility, requiring state-provided infant and daycare, and subsidies for everything from clothing to daily meals to summer camps; where children, from the earliest age, are "indoctrinated" into a new model of social cooperation; where marriage is stripped of its autonomy and specific legal protections; where the family surrenders all of its remaining functions, except controlled reproduction; where "voluntary parenthood" is assured through liberalized abortion laws and the early exposure of children to sex education; and where the parental control of children is exposed as unhealthy, as seen in this passage:

Much of the tiresome pathos which defends "individual freedom" and "responsibility for one's family" is based on a sadistic disposition to extend this "freedom" to an unbound and uncontrolled right to dominate others.²²

And third, gender equality demands the leveling of all institutions, traditions, and cultural structures that get in its way. Even the "great and fundamental differences" between men and women that were created by nature had to be eliminated or compensated for by state intervention.²³

The "Sea Change" in Values

The contest between the Christian Democratic and the Social Democratic worldviews came to a head in the 1960s. The victor would be Social Democracy. Why?

The cause, in part, was the collapse of Christian Democracy as a vital idea system. The youthful excitement, energy, and sense of positive revolution evident in the 1940s dissipated during the next decade. In France, Christian Democracy's main political vehicle, the MRP, lost support to

Charles de Gaulle's new party, the RPI (Ressemblement du Peuple Francois), and by 1958 had disappeared altogether. In Italy and Germany, meanwhile, Christian Democratic parties consolidated their hold on power, at the price of their vision. By the early 1960s, they were increasingly pragmatic, bureaucratic, and defenders of the status quo. Ambitious office seekers, rather than idealists, came to dominate the party ranks. Movements for "moral and political renewal" became simply mass parties of the right-of-center.²⁴ When a new crisis of values hit Europe with particular force in 1968, the Christian democrats were unprepared to respond. They appeared by then as old and discredited guardians of a new kind of self-satisfied materialism.

Indeed, it is now clear that a silent revolution in values set in among Europeans (and North Americans) after 1963. This marked an ideational shift away from values affirmed by Christian teaching—such as "responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, and sanctity of long-term commitments"—and toward a strong "secular individualism" focused on the desires of the self.²⁵ Surveys of European youth in the 1970s and 1980s showed that they "appear to be extending non-conformism with respect to abortion, divorce, etc., to parenthood as well," agreeing by large majorities with statements such as "children need only one parent" and "children are no longer needed for personal fulfillment."

Another commentator pointed to the swift legalization of abortion and to "the falling awareness" among Europeans "of the dignity of every person, even the old and disabled." He added, "Naked individualism and unbridled libertinism have become increasingly widespread in recent years. . . . Female emancipation, which is well advanced . . . appears to be headed in this direction" as well. Meanwhile, the courts and public opinion grew tolerant of sexual deviance.²⁶ Understood in terms of worldview, such changes symbolized the triumph of Social Democratic "sexual and family ethics" over those of Christian Democracy.

Alva Myrdal had begun her work at ECOSOC in early 1949. Two and a half years later, she moved to UNESCO in Geneva, where she headed the Division of Social Science. With other Social Democrats, she planted the seeds of change, which bore fruit after 1963:

- 1) On women's issues, as a shift from the original UN focus on gaining the vote for women and suppressing prostitution, to the new concentration on equal employment, the suppression of gender roles, the use of non-maternal child care, and family change;
- 2) On population issues, as a shift from the encouragement and protection of large families to strict attention to overpopulation as the problem, to be combatted through sex education and "reproductive rights";
- 3) On family issues, as a shift from affirmation of the family as "the fundamental and natural social group unit"

to a portrayal of the family as antiquated and oppressive; and

- 4) On human rights, as a change from a personalist focus on the innate dignity of each human person and the necessary place of humans in natural communities to a radical feminist individualism.

And there have been real consequences. The content of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is closely aligned with these new views. Taken as a whole, CEDAW strips the family of all autonomy and authority. It gives moral legitimacy solely to the isolated, radical individual. And it grants sweeping power to the state to regulate, restructure, and even abolish the natural family. This is the meaning, for example, of Article 5, which declares:

State parties shall take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices or customary and all other practices which are based. . . on stereotyped roles for men and women.

In related fashion, the Convention on the Rights of the Child contains measures that subvert the authority of parents over their children, that strip away the authority of religious faith and tradition in favor of a politicized and radical social science, and that prevent nations and peoples from sheltering their own unique cultures. In Article 13, to choose one example, we read:

[T]he child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of the child's choice.

To put it simply, this understanding of "rights" is the polar opposite of that found in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration, which states, "Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children," and is evidence of the victory of one worldview over another.

A New Opportunity?

But in recent years, an idea conflict has rekindled. Since the UN meetings at Cairo and Beijing in the mid 1990s, an international pro-family movement has begun to coalesce, by fits and starts. The contest for intellectual control of the UN continues; and the status of the family is still at the core of this struggle. Where might we go from here? A vital lesson to be drawn from the experience of the last fifty-five years is that ideas have consequences. When the United Nations Organization favored the family, it was the result of ideas developed among a relatively small circle of European and Mediterranean Christian Democrats. When the U.N.O. turned hostile to the natural family, it was the consequence of

ideas first developed among an even smaller band of Scandinavian Social Democrats. A critical current need is to build a new pro-family/pro-life vision; a fresh worldview that could be to the early twenty-first century what Christian Democracy was to the late 1940s. To succeed this time, though, this intellectual construct must appeal to more than western Christians, who no longer dominate the UN or the world. Rather, it must embrace all religiously grounded family morality systems around the globe, without descending into the banal. I believe, or at least hope, that projects such as the World Congress of Families are taking steps toward encouraging and shaping such a worldview.

A second lesson from the last fifty-five years is that “people are policy.” Charles Malik and Rene Cassin were in the right place, at the right time, to give the Universal Declaration a Christian Democratic content. The influence of Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjold, and Alva Myrdal was instrumental in the eventual victory of the Social Democratic worldview at the UN. From this angle, the imperatives for the future include:

- To take energetic action within the NGO process to blunt or prevent new assaults on family integrity;
- To place or to identify, protect, and help advance “friends of the family” within the UN Secretariat;
- And to build an international movement of religiously grounded family morality systems that can influence and eventually shape social policy at the United Nations.

NOTES

1. See Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 81–82, 1952; and R.E.M. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe*. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 30–31, 1979.

2. R.E.M. Irving, *Christian Democracy in France*. London: George Allen & Unwin, pp. 53–54, 58, 1973.

3. Irving, *The Christian Democratic Parties of Europe*, p. 31; and Einaudi and Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*, pp. 30–31.

4. Noel D. Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 180, 1996; and Einaudi and Goguel, *Christian Democracy in France and Italy*, pp. 28–30, 84.

5. Quoted in Irving, *Christian Democracy in France*, p. 55.

6. Quoted in Einaudi and Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*, p. 126.

7. Guido Dierickx, “Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals: An Empirical Comparison in the Low Countries,” in David Hanley, ed., *Christian Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective*. London & New York: Pinter Publishers, p. 24, 1994.

8. See Irving, *Christian Democracy in France*, pp. 61–62.

9. Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy*, p. 184; Einaudi and Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*, pp. 36, 59, 83.

10. From: Einaudi and Goguel, *Christian Democracy in Italy and France*, pp. 124–125, 130.

11. See Emiel Lamberts, ed, *Christian Democracy in the European Union, 1945/1995*. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, p. 440, 1997.

12. Rene Cassin, “From the Ten Commandments to the Rights of

Man,” in Shlomo Shoham, *Of Law and Man: Essays in Honor of Haim H. Cohn*. New York and Tel Aviv: Sabra Books, pp. 15–17, 1971.

13. Cassin, “Historique de la Declaration Universelle de 1948,” p. 114.

14. Lamberts, *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, p. 442.

15. See Cassin, “Historique de la Declaration Universelle de 1948,” pp. 108, 115.

16. Noted in James W. Nickel, *Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 2–9, 1987. Nickel does note one important change in the 1966 documents, when compared to the Universal Declaration: deletion of the latter’s affirmations of a right so property and so fair remuneration for property taken by the state.

17. On Lie’s background, see the excellent volume: James Barros, *Trygve Lie and the Cold War: The UN Secretary-General Pursues Peace, 1946–1953*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, pp. 45, 11, 16, 29, 35, 1989.

18. On Hammarskjold, see: Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjold*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 22–29, 1972; Joseph P. Lash, *Dag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the Brushfire Peace*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, pp. 27–32, 78–79, 1961; and Stanley Meisler, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, pp. 77–79, 1995.

19. On Alva Myrdal’s role in the population debate of the 1930s, see: Allan Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1990.

20. See Sissela Bok, *Alva Myrdal: A Daughter’s Memoir Reading*, PA: Addison-Wesley, pp. 200–205, 1991.

21. Lesser, Alva Myrdal to Disa Västberg, 14 December 1948; in Lars G. Lindskog, *Alva Myrdal: “Förnuftet maste segra!”* Kristianstad: Sveriges Radios Förlag, 1981): 86.

22. From: Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, *Kris I befolkningsfragan*. Stockholm: Bonniers, p. 299, 1934. More generally, see: Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics*, pp. 88–95.

23. On this point, see also: Alva Myrdal, et al., *Toward Equality: The Alva Myrdal Report to the Swedish Social Democratic Party*. Stockholm: Prisma, pp. 17, 38, 64, 82–84, 1972 [1969].

24. Pridham, “Christian Democracy in Italy and West Germany,” pp. 143–144.

25. See Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution, Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 216, 1977; and Ron Lesthaeghe, “A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe,” *Population and Development Review* 9, p. 29, Sep 1983.

26. Lamberts, *Christian Democracy in the European Union*, p. 445.